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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Centennial Bank, or is successor in interest (hereafter, "Bank") erroneously 
contends that this Court should reverse the lower court that correctly concluded 
that the equitable doctrine of reformation was inapplicable to the instant case. This 
court should affirm because reformation cannot reform and give retroactive effect 
to a document that never existed and was never even contemplated by the Bank. 
Furthermore the Bank was inexcusably negligent in failing to prepare the 
documents it now wants the court to judicially create and give effect to after the 
fact. There was no 'scrivener's error' as the Bank contends, nor any error on the 
part of a third party, but actually the blatant failure by the bank to even 
contemplate a transaction like it now is attempting to have the court judicially 
impose. The Bank's reformation theory would also violate Utah's Statute of 
Frauds and would incorrectly grant an equitable interest that would enjoy priority 
over a statutorily created interest. The Court should affirm the lower court's 
decision denying the Bank reformation. 
The trial court misapplied the after-acquired title doctrine in open disregard 
of Utah's recording statutes. Brad Taylor lent money against the property before 
the Bank did. There was nothing on record that would have shown any interest 
held by the Bank on June 1,2006 when Mr. Taylor lent his money and obtained a 
1 
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deed of trust. The June 1, 2006 Deed of Trust is attached hereto as Addendum 1. 
The lower court incorrectly made a factual determination that Mr. Taylor was on 
notice of the Bank's interest when there existed a factual dispute as to notice. It 
also erroneously concluded that a wild deed imparts notice to prospective interest 
holders under Utah law. 
Equity favors Mr. Taylor, who, unlike the Bank did all he could to protect 
his interest in the property. The Bank, which could have avoided its loss, sat on its 
rights, being on notice of the real owner of the property, but nonetheless failing for 
nearly seven months to secure a conveyance from the true owner, and now cleverly 
seeks to use the after-acquired title statute to remove a superior interest of record. 
Utah Code §57-1-10 and §57-1-20 do not contemplate removing intervening 
interests in their application. This Court should not allow the lower court to use 
the statutes as a sword to injure Mr. Taylor, who holds a recorded and perfected 
interest in the subject property. 
This Court should clarify the application of the after-acquired title doctrine 
consistent with the Legislature's intent. The Court should reverse the lower court's 
misapplication of the after-acquired title statute. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE BANK'S CLAIM OF 
REFORMATION. 
2 
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Under Utah law, there are generally two grounds for reformation: mutual 
mistake of the parties, or ignorance or mistake by one party, coupled with fraud by 
the other party. Hottinger v. Jensen. 684 P.2d 1271.1273 (Utah 1984) . 
("Reformation of a deed is a proceeding in equity and is appropriate where the 
terms of the written instrument are mistaken in that they do not show the true intent 
of the agreement between the parties.") 
A. The doctrine of reformation cannot create an instrument that was 
never contemplated and never came into existence. 
Black's Law Dictionary characterizes reformation as "An equitable 
remedy by which a court will modify a written agreement to reflect the actual 
intent of the parties, usu. to correct fraud or mutual mistake in the writing . . . . " 
Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), reformation. 
It is unquestionably clear from Utah case law and other reputable sources 
that the doctrine of reformation applies only to written instruments, and does not 
work to fantastically create an instrument that never existed in the first place. Utah 
courts characterize reformation as: 
• "Reformation is appropriate where the written instrument is not in 
conformity with the parties' agreement...." Grahn v. Gregory. 800 P.2d 
320, 325 (Utah App. 1990) (emphasis added). 
• "Reformation of a deed is a proceeding in equity and is appropriate where 
the terms of the written instrument are mistaken." Hottinger v. Jensen. 684 
P.2d 1271,1273 (Utah 1984) (emphasis added). 
• "Mutual mistake of fact may be defined as error in reducing the concurring 
intentions of the parties to writing." RHN Corp. v. Veibell. 96 P.3d 935, 
3 
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945 (Utah 2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
The foregoing case citations are merely representative. Many other Utah cases 
indicate that in Utah the equitable doctrine of reformation can apply only to an 
existing written instrument. 
In conducting research for this brief, Appellant has found no example of a 
court using the doctrine of reformation to create a previously non-existent 
instrument, and Appellant believes that no such cases exist. Also, tellingly, the 
Bank has failed to provide even one example in which a court applied the doctrine 
of reformation to create a document that was never prepared by either party for 
which the document would be prepared and also give such document retroactive 
effect despite intervening and properly recorded interests. 
B. Reformation cannot cure the Bank's inexcusable negligence. 
Reformation "is not available to rewrite a contract to include terms never 
contemplated by the parties." RHN Corp. v. Veibell 96 P.3d 935, 945 (Utah, 
2004); citing Cunningham v. Cunningham, 690 P.2d 549, 552 (Utah 1984) 
(overruled on other grounds by State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58,143, 27 P.3d 1115). In 
Cunningham, the Court said: 
[W]e are aware of no authority that can support the trial court's 
attempted exercise of its equitable powers under the circumstances of 
this case. A court does not have carte blanche to reform any 
transaction to include terms that it believes are fair. Its discretion 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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is narrowly bounded. Reformation may be appropriate where 
both parties were mistaken as to a term of the contract, or where 
one party is mistaken and the other party is guilty of inequitable 
conduct, see Bown v. Loveland, 678 P.2d 292 (Utah 1984), but it is 
not available to rewrite a contract to include terms never contemplated 
by the parties. Isaak v. Massachusetts Indemnity Life Insurance Co.. 
127 Ariz. 581, 584, 623 P.2d 11, 14 (1981). 
Cunningham, at 552 (emphasis added). 
In this case, there was no mutual mistake by the parties. It is clear that the 
Bank intended to loan money to Gary McDonald personally, and that is exactly 
what happened. Reformation cannot possibly serve to fix documents that were 
executed just as the Bank intended. The Bank makes no contention that 
McDonald, or any one else perpetuated a fraud on them by not having G&L Mac, 
Inc., the true owner in interest, execute a deed to convey the property to McDonald 
or Centennial. 
The Bank claims that its failure to obtain a deed of trust from the owner of 
the property was the result of either a "scrivener's error," or the error of a third-
party, but this is not so. "Centennial Bank prepares its own loan documentation 
including deeds of trust." Affidavit of Jane Stevenson, f 17 (R 560-622) 
(emphasis added). But the Bank "did not prepare a deed conveying title to the 
property to Mr. McDonald individually...." Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll |20 (R. 
525-559). In fact, Centennial contends in its Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment that: 
5 
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After the Loan documentation was approved by McDonald and the Bank, all 
that was required was for the title company to close the transaction, which 
required McDonald to execute the Loan documents, and for the title 
company to record the documents. 
Addendum 1 to Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant, P. 41. What the Bank expected 
and anticipated is exactly what happened; now the Bank does not like the result. 
Pursuant to RHN Corp., there can be no reformation to include terms in a deed 
nobody prepared especially because the bank prepared its own documents and 
insists in its brief that all that remained was execution of those documents. 
Although in its appellate brief it points the finger of blame at a third party, 
the Bank declared before the lower court that it never prepared the necessary 
documents to obtain a deed from G&L Mac, Inc. when it closed its loan to Gary 
McDonald. Centennial acknowledges that it failed to prepare a document to gain 
title to the property in June 2006 (See Aff. of Cheryl Driscoll ffl[19-20 (R- 525-559) 
and Aff. of Jane Stevenson ffl[28 and 32 (R. 560-622). By so doing, the Bank 
created the circumstances that led to its own loss. It was the Bank itself that failed 
to obtain a document attempting to secure G&L Mac Inc.'s property until 
December 22, 2006. 
The Bank is also precluded from obtaining the equitable relief of 
reformation because the alleged "error," i.e. failure to prepare and execute a deed 
from G&L Mac to McDonald, resulted from The Bank's own inexcusable 
negligence. The Bank prepares its own conveyance documents, but failed to do so 
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in this instance. A party cannot seek reformation of a written instrument when the 
alleged error to be reformed resulted from the party's inexcusable negligence. 
Thompson v. Smith, 620 P.2d 520, 524 (Utah 1980) (citation omitted); George v. 
Fritsch Loan & Trust Co., 256 P. 400, 403 (Utah 1927). 
"It is important to note that an attempt to reform a deed is a proceeding in 
equity. A court of equity will generally not assist one in extricating himself from 
circumstances which he has created." Battistone v. American Land & Dev. Co., 
607 P.2d 837, 839 (Utah 1980). No third party prepared or even intended to 
prepare documents on behalf of the Bank. The title company just had Mr. 
McDonald execute, in his individual capacity, the documents the Bank itself 
provided for him to sign. See Affidavit of Jane Stevenson fflf 17,18,19,20, 21,28 
and 32, (R. 560-622). 
The Bank has declared that it prepares its own documents in transactions 
such as the one in dispute. Now the Bank, although it knows that it prepared the 
package of documents, but failed to prepare one to obtain the property from the 
true owner, is faulting the escrow officer for following the Bank's instructions to 
have McDonald execute the documents the Bank provided for execution. 
Conveniently, the Bank points the finger of blame at the escrow agent. If the Bank 
prepares all of its own documents as it asserts, and if all the title company had to 
do was close the transaction by executing the documents the Bank had provided, 
where else was the "missing" deed supposed to come from? There was no mistake 
7 
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by a draftsman, but a failure on the part of the Bank to prepare and cause the 
necessary documents to be executed to obtain title to the property at issue from the 
actual owner. Pursuant to Battistone. the lower court correctly declined to do 
inequity with the equitable doctrine of reformation by relieving the Bank of the 
consequences of its own error. 
Here, as explained above, The Bank has claimed that it prepared all of its 
own documents. The Bank did not prepare, and has failed to bring evidence that it 
requested from any other party, a trust deed from G&L Mac to McDonald. Because 
the Bank's alleged "error" resulted from its own inexcusable negligence, The Bank 
cannot now bring a claim for reformation. 
C. There was no scrivener's error - just the Bank's own error. 
The instant facts do not involve a scrivener's error that a court can correct 
through reformation. The Bank mischaracterizes the trial court's reformation ruling 
in an attempt to present such ruling as a holding against which the Bank has (what 
it claims to be) contrary case law. The Bank characterizes, "the trial court's ruling 
that the failure to execute a document is not a scrivener's error." Brief of 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant, at 30. However, the trial court actually ruled, as the 
Bank actually cited in its brief, that the failure to execute a non-prepared/non-
provided/non-existent document is not a scrivener's error: "[T]he documents 
executed were the documents intended with the only error being that one additional 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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document was not provided and therefore not executed." Brief of Appellee/Cross-
Appellant, at 30 (citing R. 11441). 
To refute its mischaracterization of the trial court's ruling (that "failure to 
execute a document does not amount to a scrivener's error,") the Bank relies on a 
1912 case out of Maryland: Aetna Indemnity v. Baltimore S.P.&C. Rv. Co., 84 A. 
166 (Maryland App, 1912). Aetna does not help the Bank because it stands only to 
refute a ruling that the trial court in this matter did not even make. In Aetna, the 
Maryland court found it appropriate to reform a bond instrument that had not been 
fully executed because one of the parties had not signed such instrument—where 
(1) the bond instrument had been prepared in writing, properly received by the 
insured party, and was in possession of the insured party; (2) the party providing 
the bond testified that "it was [its] intention . . . to deliver a good and sufficient 
bond, and its president and secretary stated their understanding that they had in fact 
executed the instrument for the company before it was delivered"; and (3) all 
relevant parties intended for the bond instrument to be properly executed and 
believed that the bond instrument had been properly executed. Aetna Indem. Co. v. 
Baltimore. S.P. & C. Ry. Co. 117 Md. 523, 84 A. 166, 166-68 (Md. 1912). The 
material facts of the instant situation all differ from the facts of Aetna because the 
deed to McDonald never existed and was never even contemplated bv the Bank. 
The failure to prepare a document when it is in the practice of preparing its own 
1
 Court's Memorandum Decision of October 6, 2009. 
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documents is the Bank's own error, and not the error of any third party. No case 
stands for the proposition that the doctrine of reformation can create and treat as 
previously executed an instrument that never came into existence and was never 
even contemplated at the time by the party seeking reformation. 
D. The Statute of Frauds prevents the misapplication of the doctrine 
of reformation sought by the Bank. 
Applying the doctrine of reformation to create a non-existent document 
would violate the Statute of Frauds, which requires that a transfer of real estate be 
in writing. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1. Equitable doctrines cannot be used to 
contravene an express statute. 
Although a court, sitting in equity, exercises discretion in granting or 
denying relief, it does not have the authority to ignore existing principles of 
law in favor of its view of the equities . . . 'equity obeys and conforms to the 
law's general rules and policies whether the common law or statute law.' 
Warner v. Sirstins. 838 P.2d 666, 670 (Utah App. 1992) (some citations omitted) 
(quoting Jarvis v. State Land Dep't 479 P.2d 169, 173 (Ariz. 1970)). "Equity 
follows the law. It cannot abridge an explicit, statutory requirement." Smith v. 
Batchelor. 832 P.2d 467, 471 (Utah 1992). As worded in another jurisdiction: 
Rules of equity cannot be intruded in matters that are plain and fully covered 
by positive statute. Neither a fiction nor a maxim may nullify a statute. Nor 
will a court of equity ever lend its aid to accomplish by indirection what the 
law or its clearly defined policy forbids to be done directly. 
Gardiner Solder Co. v. Supallov Corp.. Inc., 232 Cal.App.3d 1537,1543 (Cal. 
App. 1991). The Bank attempts to persuade the Court to do what cannot be done: 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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convey real property without a written instrument in violation of Utah's Statute of 
Frauds by applying the equitable doctrine of reformation. The lower court 
properly declined to do so and this Court should affirm on the issue of 
Reformation. 
E. An interest created by equity cannot have priority over a 
properly executed non-equitable interest. 
While equitable reformation may apply to provide relief to resolve disputes 
between the parties to the transaction at issue (i.e., Centennial, McDonald, and 
G&L Mac), an equitable interest, e.g., right to claim for reformation, cannot 
prevail over a subsequently acquired non-equitable interest, even if unrecorded. 
Hottinger v. Jensen. 684 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah 1984) (citation omitted) ("[T]he 
right of reformation of a deed can be cut off by purchase of the property by a bona 
fide purchaser for value without notice of the mistake."); Grahn v. Gregory, 800 
P.2d 320 (Utah App. 1990) (citation omitted); Federal Land Bank of Berkeley v. 
Pace. 87 Utah 156, 48 (P.2d 480,482) (Utah 1935). In this case, on June 1, 2006 
when Mr. Taylor lent money against the property, he had no notice of an interest 
that Mr. McDonald (who did not own the property) would attempt on June 2, 2006 
to encumber the same property by borrowing money from the Bank. Mr. Taylor 
discovered the error in his own title and corrected the same in September 2006, 
being unaware of any interest predating his June 1st loan. Mr. Taylor's interest in 
the property vested on June 1,2006, but was not perfected until he later obtained a 
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deed of trust from the true owner in September 2006. Accordingly, as a bona fide 
lender without notice on June 1,2006, Mr. Taylor, by perfecting his previously 
vested interest obtained a statutorily protected interest in the property by virtue of 
the Race-Notice statutes in Title 57 Chapter 3. The Bank cannot utilize a equitably 
created interest to supersede the statutorily created interest held by Mr. Taylor. 
II. THE BANK SEEKS TO DO INEQUITY BY MISAPPLYING 
EQUITABLE DOCTRINES. 
The doctrine of Equitable Subrogation is applicable where a lender steps into 
the shoes of a mortgagor and pays off a lien on the mortgaged property, and 
thereby gaining the same status as the lien that was satisfied with the lender's 
money. Martin v. Hickenlooper, 59 P. 1139,1152 (Utah 1936). There is no case 
law to support the contention that the Bank is asking the Court to agree with, that is 
that the doctrine of subrogation can apply where the mortgagor, who has no 
interest in the subject real property attempts to and successfully borrows money 
against property that was never his in the first place, and then the lending party, the 
Bank, comes in and attempts to insert itself into the chain of title to the detriment 
of a prior lender (Taylor) that loaned money against the property beforehand and 
secured a Deed of Trust from the actual property owner months earlier. In this 
case, the Bank never lent money against the property until after Mr. Taylor did so, 
and was never in the chain of title until after Mr. Taylor. 
A. Brad Taylor was first in time to lend money against the property. 
12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Not only did McDonald and Andersen enter into an agreement with 
McDonald before McDonald did so with the Bank, but they both signed the Deed 
of Trust to encumber the subject property in favor of Brad Taylor on June 1, 2006. 
See Taylor Affidavit fflflO and Exhibit 2 attached thereto (R. 709-741). Mr. 
Taylor's interest in the property was vested by him lending money against it on 
June 1, 2006. It was Brad Taylor's understanding that the Deed of Trust would be 
recorded prior to the release of any funds (See Taylor Affidavit ffl[12-15) and that it 
would be a first position lien (See Taylor Affidavit %6). Ryan Andersen 
represented to Mr. Taylor that such would be the case. See Taylor Affidavit ffl[8-9. 
In fact, Mr. Taylor specifically instructed First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah 
to record the Deed of Trust before disbursing the loan funds. See Taylor Affidavit 
Hii. 
On June 1, 2006 Ryan Andersen of G&L Mac, Inc. expressly "assured" Brad 
Taylor that his deed of trust, executed that day would be a first lien deed of trust. 
Both McDonald and Andersen executed the June 1,2006 Deed of Trust and 
Assignment of Rents a day before McDonald alone signed a subsequent deed of 
trust in favor of Centennial Bank. In fact, Equity and justice require this Court to 
not allow the Bank to forcibly subrogate Mr. Taylor's prior loan and thereby injure 
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Taylor was the first lender (amongst the parties to this action) that 
agreed to and actually lent money on the property by executing a Deed of Trust 
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with both owners of G&L Mac, Inc. the day before the Bank entered into an 
agreement with one of the owners, Gary McDonald. 
It is undisputed that Brad Taylor's money in fact was used to satisfy the 
loans to Millennia Investment Corporation and Cottonwood Assets. See Affidavit 
of Jane Stevensen ffl[35-36 (R. 560-622). In fact, Mr. Taylor's money was wired to 
Mountain View Title before Centennial's money was wired. The $226,175.16 was 
received as partial satisfaction of the Millennia Investment loan ($957,565.11). 
See Exhibits 17 and 18 to the Affidavit of Jane Stevensen (R. 560-622), see also 
the Affidavit of Troy Kohler (R. 666-669). The bank cannot claim that its money 
alone was used to pay the existing debts and that Mr. Taylor's money was not. 
Such is contrary to undisputed fact. 
B. Equity cannot be used to injure an innocent lender. 
The law is clear that the equitable relief of subrogation "is enforced solely 
for the accomplishment of substantial justice where one has an equity to invoke 
which cannot injure an innocent person." Hickenlooper at 1141 (internal 
citation omitted and emphasis added). Brad Taylor lent money on June 1, 2006 to 
unencumber the subject property. His equitable interest in the property vested on 
June 1, 2006. On June 1, 2006 there was nothing in the County Recorder's office 
to indicate a prior interest, or that the Bank would possibly lend money thereafter. 
Furthermore, months later, upon learning that he had obtained his trust deed from 
individuals not having title to the property, Brad Taylor obtained a replacement 
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note and Deed of Trust from G&L Mac. Inc., the actual owner of the property, on 
September 5, 2006 - which was recorded the following day. This took place 
several months before the conveyance of the encumbered property by G&L Mac 
To Gary McDonald on December 22, 2006. Now Centennial wants the Court to 
ignore Mr. Taylor's loan and artificially place the bank ahead of Mr. Taylor, the 
first lender. 
Since Brad Taylor has an equitably vested interest in the property that 
precedes in time that of the Bank, the bank cannot rely on the equitable remedy of 
subrogation to do an injustice and jump ahead of his interest. Brad Taylor did the 
same thing as the bank, he lent hundreds of thousands of dollars so Gary 
McDonald and Ryan Andersen could unencumber the subject property, and Mr. 
Taylor's money was in fact sent to the seller (care of Mountain View Title) via 
wire request made on June 1, 2006, and funded on June 2, 2006. See the Affidavit 
of Brad Taylor, fflj 6, 10, 12,13,15. (R. 709-741). The biggest difference between 
the Bank and Mr. Taylor is that Brad Taylor was first to loan the money; he 
reached a deal first, executed a Note for the loan first, had McDonald and 
Andersen both execute a Deed of Trust first, and was first to actually wire the 
money to pay off the prior encumbrances on property. Subsequently, Mr. Taylor 
was first to obtain a secured interest with the real owner in interest ~ G&L Mac, 
Inc. The Bank, which also lent money to an individual that did not own the security 
property, actually entered into its contracts to lend money for the same purpose the 
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very next day, June 2, 2006, and its wire arrived at Zions Bank after the wire from 
Mr. Taylor had already funded. See the Affidavit of Troy Kohler (R. 666-669). 
Equity does not support allowing Centennial to leap-frog the interest of Mr. 
Taylor, but demands that he, being the first bona fide lender, be made whole first. 
The Bank's theory would allow an invalid, essentially phantom conveyance, 
made and recorded by a grantor not having any property interest at the time of 
conveyance, to inhibit and essentially halt the alienability and marketability of land 
by utilizing an equitable doctrine to cheat a prior lender (Mr. Taylor - who lent on 
June 1, 2006) out of his security by ignoring the properly recorded interest of Mr. 
Taylor as recorded on September 6, 2006 and granting the Bank a fee interest when 
it did not obtain any interest from an owner until December 22,2006, which 
interest was already subject to Mr. Taylor's deed of trust when Mr. McDonald 
received the same. "[I]t is [] the policy of the law . . . to keep land titles clear and 
to encourage alienability of property rather than the contrary." Boyle v. Baggs. 350 
P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1960); Christensen v. Christensen, 176 P.3d 626 (Wyo. 2008) 
("Generally, the law favors the free alienability of property interests."). Under 
Centennial's theory, there would be essentially no market to purchase any interest 
in land relative to which a previous "phantom" or "wild deed" conveyance had 
been recorded, because the land would always be subject to immediate 
dispossession upon the original grantor's (grantor of the "wild deed") acquisition 
of any interest in the land. Any third-party could impose this cloud over any 
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property by simply making and recording a "phantom" deed and then some time 
later, after the property has been fully encumbered by other parties, obtain a special 
warranty deed from the actual owner, and by misapplication of the after-acquired 
title statute, be able to remove all prior encumbrances that were put on title after 
the phantom recording was made. Because the Bank's theory would empower any 
non-party to cloud title and discourage alienability, is the "policy of the law," that 
such a theory cannot be the law. 
Mr. Taylor's deed from G&L Mac, Inc., the true owner, recorded September 
6, 2006, became a matter of record for the world to see more than three months 
before Centennial obtained any conveyance document from G&L Mac, Inc. It 
would be inequitable for Centennial to be allowed by this Court to jump ahead of 
Mr. Taylor, especially because it was Mr. Taylor who was first to properly secure 
his interest in the property by obtaining a deed from the true owner. 
C. There was no actual or constructive notice to anyone on June 1, 
2006 when Mr. Taylor lent money against the property. 
The Bank cites to Utah's recording statute - U.C.A. §57-3-102 in an attempt 
to wrest the law by erroneously arguing that the recording by the Bank on June 2, 
2006 could somehow give constructive notice to Taylor on June 1, 2006 when he 
lent money and obtained a deed of trust as security. First, notice is a factual issue 
that is in dispute that cannot be resolved on summary judgment, thus the lower 
court erred by finding that Mr. Taylor had notice of the Bank's interest. 
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Mr. Taylor provided evidence that he was repeatedly assured that his interest 
in the property would be in first position. See Brad Taylor Affidavit fflf 6, 8, 18 
and 15 (R. 709-741). In fact, Brad Taylor lent money against the property on June 
1,2006 (Id. at IflflO, 12 and 13), when there was no record of any interest held by 
the Bank. Even by the Bank's own contention, it did not obtain an interest until 
June 2, 2006, thus it is impossible for Brad Taylor to have had notice of any 
interest in the Bank before the same was even created. The Bank's assertion that it 
is undisputed that Mr. Taylor had actual knowledge of such interest (Brief of 
Appellee/Cross Appellant, p. 26) is blatantly false. At that time, there was no 
interest whatsoever held by the Bank, and there was no executed or recorded 
document that could have possibly given Mr. Taylor, or any other individual any 
notice of a prior interest held by the Bank. 
Notably, the factual issue of whether Mr. Taylor had notice on June 1,2006 
of the Bank's interest must be determined by the court in order for the Bank to 
leapfrog over Mr. Taylor because the Bank is seeking to have equity trump the 
race-notice statutes to Mr. Taylor's detriment. Conversely Mr. Taylor is not 
seeking equitable relief from the statute, but actually sought an enforcement of the 
black letter of the law. 
Secondly, the Bank's reliance on mechanic's liens law has no application 
because the Bank itself loaned its money only after Mr. Taylor already did so. 
Furthermore, the Bank never secured a deed from the true owner until several 
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months after Mr. Taylor did. The Bank is now inappropriately and inequitably 
trying to leapfrog over Mr. Taylor despite the clear and foreseeable consequence of 
its own admitted error. 
III. A WILD DEED IMPARTS NO NOTICE. 
A wild or spurious deed fails to impart notice. The Bank argues that a wild 
or spurious deed fails to impart constructive notice only if such deed is a forgery. 
However, in addition to the numerous persuasive cases from other jurisdictions, the 
Utah Supreme Court has held that a "void" deed fails to give notice to anybody: 
"The recording of a forged deed gives no notice to the world or to anybody within 
it of the contents thereof. Such a deed is void " Rasmussen v. Olsen, 583 P.2d 
50, 52-53 (Utah 1978) (citations omitted). This Utah Supreme Court statement in 
Rasmussen does not indicate merely that a forged deed fails to give notice because 
it is forged. The "forgery" sentence must be read in context. The very next 
sentence provides the reason that a forged deed gives no notice is because "such a 
deed is void . . . ." (emphasis added). The Bank has adduced neither reasoning nor 
authority for its implied assertion that the only type of wild or spurious deed that 
fails to provide notice is a forged deed. In fact, the Utah Supreme Court itself 
reasoned that the "void" nature of a deed is the characteristic that results in failure 
to provide notice.2 
In re MacArthur. which The Bank cites in support of its proposition that a recording of an 
invalid wild deed may give notice, is inapplicable and fails to support The Bank's position. In re 
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IV. CENTENNIAL BANK COULD HAVE AVOIDED ITS LOSS, BUT 
BRAD TAYLOR COULD NOT. 
A. The Bank could have avoided its loss by preparing and executing 
a conveyance from G&L Mac, Inc in June 2006, but failed to. 
The Bank conveniently omits a key fact from its brief. It prepares its own 
conveyance documents for loans. The Bank has declared that it prepares its own 
documents in transactions such as the one in dispute. "Centennial Bank prepares 
its own loan documentation including deeds of trust." Affidavit of Jane 
Stevenson, [^17 (R 560-622) (emphasis added). Interestingly, throughout its 
MacArthur, 430 B.R. 300 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2010). In in re Macarthur, the court addressed the 
question of whether recording of a valid instrument that actually conveyed a property interest, 
where the instrument did not fully comply with Georgia's statutory requirements for recording 
because of a missing notarization, could impart constructive notice. Id. at 304-05. The court 
determined that such a defectively-recorded instrument could impart constructive notice in some 
situations when the defect did not detract from the instrument's ability to provide notice of an 
actual interest under Georgia's indexing system. I d at 304-05. The material facts of in re 
MacArthur completely differ from the instant case in the only two aspects that matter: (1) 
McDonald's trust deed conveyed no interest at all because it was completely invalid and (2) 
McDonald's trust deed did not suffer from a notarization defect that made it unrecordable under 
the recording statutes; McDonald's trust suffered from the defect that McDonald had no interest 
to convey. The passage The Bank quotes in its brief highlights in re MacDonald's 
inapplicability: "[T]he existence of the unattested signature of Mrs. MacArthur does not prevent 
the security deed from being recorded as to the transfer of the Debtor's interest in the properties." 
There was a "transfer of interest" in in re MacArthur, which did not occur in the instant case. 
The Bank cites another case with facts similar to in re MacArthur, but which is even less 
applicable to the instant facts that in re MacArthur. MERS v. Odita also addressed the effect of 
recording a valid instrument that actually conveyed a property interest, where the instrument did 
not fully comply with state (Ohio) statutory requirements for recording because of a missing 
notarization. MERS v. Odita, 822 N.E. 2d 821 (Ohio App. 2004). However, MERS did not even 
address the notice question. The MERS court found that the relevant parties had actual notice, 
but concluded that notice was altogether irrelevant Ohio statute provided that the first mortgage 
was unrecordable because of its missing-notarization defect and that, under Ohio statute, the first 
mortgage was per se inferior to a subsequent properly recorded mortgage, regardless of whether 
the subsequent mortgagee had actual notice of the first mortgage. MERS at 825-29. Because 
MERS suffers from the same irrelevance problems as in re MacArthur, and additionally does not 
even address notice, MERS fails to shed any light at all on the issue of whether an 
invalid/spurious/wild deed imparts notice. 
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briefing, the Bank claims that through some inadvertence the right documents were 
not prepared for the Bank, as if it was someone else's responsibility, but the reality 
is that the Bank prepares its own documents and can blame no third party for its 
own neglect. The Bank could have avoided its own loss by properly identifying 
the owner of the property and preparing a conveyance document from that owner. 
The Bank has sought equitable relief from Utah's Race-Notice Statute (UCA 
§57-3-102) on one hand, but argues on the other hand that the statute is a valid 
basis for the Court to ignore Mr. Taylor's equitable argument. The Bank's 
reasoning is inconsistent at best. Because Mr. Taylor was the first party to loan 
money on the property that is the subject of this litigation, equity should not 
deprive him of his recorded position that is several months ahead of the Bank. The 
Bank cannot rely on equitable relief to get around the fact that Mr. Taylor recorded 
his deed of trust with the Salt Lake County Recorder months before the Bank 
attempted to obtain a deed from the true owner of the property, because the Bank's 
title problem is its own fault. Battistone v. American Land & Dev. Co.. 607 P.2d 
837, 839 (Utah 1980). 
The Bank acknowledges that it failed to prepare a document to gain title to 
the property in June 2006 (See Aff. of Cheryl Driscoll Hfl9-20 (R. 525-559) and 
Aff. of Jane Stevenson fflf28 and 32 (R. 560-622). By so doing, the Bank created 
the circumstances that led to its own loss. It was the Bank that itself that failed to 
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obtain a document attempting to secure G&L Mac Inc.'s property until December 
22,2006. The Bank could have avoided this error, but did not, and now seeks 
equitable relief from the consequence of its own neglect and fault. 
B. Brad Taylor did what he could to avoid loss. 
Mr. Taylor instructed the title company that Taylor's lien had to be secured 
by the recording of the Deed of Trust and Assignment of Rents before the money 
could be wired. See Taylor Aff. ffljl 1,16 (R.709-741). Mr. Taylor had no way of 
knowing the First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah would actually disburse the 
funds before recording his deed. He did all he could to preserve his rights when he 
loaned money against the property on June 1, 2006. See Id. Upon learning who 
the true owner was, Mr. Taylor was the first party to obtain a trust deed from G&L 
Mac, Inc. and record on September 6, 2006. Id |23. As of September 6, 2006, Mr. 
Taylor was secured by a deed of trust from the true owner, and the Bank was 
several months away from attempting to follow Mr. Taylor's lead and attempt to 
secure its position. 
The Bank on the other hand by its own admission failed to obtain a deed 
from G&L Mac, Inc. until December 22, 2006. Now the Bank is cleverly trying to 
get ahead of Mr. Taylor despite being months behind him in attempting to secure 
its interest with the true owner. 
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C. Equity aids Brad Taylor for being vigilant and securing a deed 
from the property owner. Equity disfavors the Bank for letting 
more than 6 months elapse before attempting to secure a deed 
from the actual property owner. 
Equity aids the vigilant. Brad Taylor learned of an error in his previous 
security and obtained a deed from G&L Mac, Inc. on September 5,2006, which 
was recorded the following day. See The Affidavit of Brad Taylor f 23 (R. 709-
741). As of September 6,2006, once again the world was on notice that G&L Mac 
was the true owner of the subject property. The Bank was on notice. 
The Bank on the other hand executed its paperwork with Gary McDonald on 
June 2, 2006, but failed to obtain a conveyance document from G&L Mac, Inc. 
until more than six (6) months elapsed. Finally, after 'sleeping' for over a half a 
year, and several months after being on notice of Mr. Taylor's Deed of Trust 
recorded on September 6, 2006, the Bank sought out the real owner in interest to 
get a conveyance document after the fact. The Bank's actions were a clever 
maneuver attempting to utilize the after-acquired title statute to remove Mr. 
Taylor's previously recorded and valid deed of trust. It would appear that Mr. 
Taylor correcting his error in three months was more vigilant than the Bank, which 
failed to correct its error for almost seven months, and more than three months 
being on notice that Mr. Taylor had secured his interest with the real property 
owner. Indeed, equity should reward Mr. Taylor for his vigilance, and not punish 
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him by allowing the Bank to gain priority over him after ignoring its error for more 
than a half a year. 
V. UTAH CODE $57-1-10 and $57-1-20 DO NOT CONTEMPLATE 
INTERVENING INTERESTS AND DO NOT OPERATE TO INURE 
AN INTEREST IN THE BANK SUPERIOR TO THAT OF MR. 
TAYLOR. 
Utah Code §57-1-10 has no language addressing the issue of an intervening 
interest. Likewise, §57-1-20 has no language addressing such. Importantly, the 
Bank cites no case law to address the scenario in this case, where there is an 
intervening interest of Mr. Taylor that is on title before the Bank obtains a 
conveyance from the owner of the real property. 
Utah Code §57-1-10 is clear by its language that the title obtained by the 
Bank in December 2006, that even through the application of the statute, the bank 
would "acquire the legal estate subsequently acquired" by McDonald. The legal 
estate title McDonald acquired was a fee interest subject to the prior encumbrance 
of September 6, 2006 in favor of Brad Taylor. So even if the statute were applied, 
the result would be that the Bank would acquire an interest subject to that of Mr. 
Taylor (which is exactly what Mr. McDonald obtained), and the Bank would 
obtain such interest only by virtue of the statute artificially relating the conveyance 
back to June 2, 2006. 
Utah Code §57-1-20 deals with transfers in trust, and clearly states that "All 
right, title, interest and claim in and to the trust property acquired by the trustor, or 
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the trustor's successors in interest, subsequent to the execution of the trust deed, 
shall inure to the trustee...." Thus applying this language to this case, all the right, 
title and interest that McDonald acquired after executing the trust deed, inures to 
the Bank. McDonald acquired a fee interest in the subject property subject to the 
previously recorded trust deed in favor of Brad Taylor that was properly recorded 
on September 6, 2006. It is impossible to contend that §57-1-20 functions to inure 
in the Bank more of an interest than McDonald ever acquired. 
VI. THE INTENTIONS OF MCDONALD ARE UNKNOWN. 
The Bank contends that the intentions of McDonald were known and 
consistent with those declared by the Bank, however, there is no statement from 
McDonald to support such an assertion. The Bank attempted to utilize the 
affidavits of several individuals to enter into the record what Mr. McDonald said or 
represented. Paragraphs 9,11,12,13,14 and 15 of the Affidavit of Eric Stevenson 
(R. 442-448) are hearsay statements about what Mr. McDonald said and intended. 
Mr. Taylor objected to such statements (R. 657-665), but the lower court never 
ruled on the objections. Paragraphs 41 of the Affidavit of Jane Stevenson (R. 560-
622), paragraphs 32 and 33 of the Affidavit of Cheryl Driscoll (R. 525-559) and 
paragraphs 5 and 8 of the Affidavit of Suzanne Gnehm (R. 490-522) are hearsay 
statements about what Mr. McDonald said and intended. Mr. Taylor objected to 
such statements (R. 701-708, 648-656, and 682-689 respectively), but the lower 
court never ruled on the objections. Certainly the alleged statements and 
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intentions of Mr. McDonald cannot be established by way of hearsay and 
unfounded and speculative affidavit statements that are contrary to the Utah Rules 
of Evidence. 
The problem with the Bank's logic is two-fold. First of all, there is no 
evidence from Mr. McDonald, and the hearsay portions of the affidavits of cited 
above are inadmissible, and objections to the same were filed with the court, but 
never ruled on. Second, any inferences on the facts on the Bank's motion for 
summary judgment must be construed in favor of Brad Taylor. Thus absent any 
evidence from Mr. McDonald, the lower court was bound to construe the relevant 
facts regarding what Mr. McDonald said or intended in favor of Mr. Taylor and 
against the Bank. 
CONCLUSION 
The Bank cannot use the equitable doctrine of reformation to create an 
instrument that was never contemplated, and never came into existence. Such an 
equitable doctrine cannot relieve the Bank from the consequences of its own 
negligence in failing to prepare the documents necessary to obtain an interest in the 
subject property. Utah law does not allow the Bank to use reformation as a vehicle 
to violate the Statute of Frauds and hold priority over an intervening statutorily 
authorized interest in Mr. Taylor. The Court should affirm that reformation of the 
Bank's deed of trust would be improper under Utah law. 
26 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Bank places strong reliance on Utah's Race-Notice statute by the fact 
that its deed of trust from a non-owner was recorded on Friday June 2, 2006 and 
Mr. Taylor's June 1 Deed of Trust from non-owners was not recorded until 
Monday June 5,2006. However, since Mr. Taylor was first to properly secure his 
loan by obtaining a deed of trust from the actual owner and recording the same on 
September 6, 2006, the Bank desires not to be bound by Utah's recording statute 
since it never obtained an interest from the real owner of the property. Instead the 
Bank cleverly relies on a statute, the after-acquired title statute for a purpose for 
which it was not intended - to leapfrog another valid interest that is superior in 
title. It is unfair to reward the Bank on one hand by acknowledging the effect of 
recording on June 2nd as compared to June 5th, and then ignoring the recording 
statute with regards to a deed of trust from the actual owner in September and at 
the same time apply an equitable doctrine to create a fiction - a valid interest in the 
bank from the property owner as of June 2, 2006. The Bank wants to have the 
court apply the recording statute when it benefits the Bank, and ignore it when it 
benefits Mr. Taylor. The Court should apply Utah statutes consistently and reverse 
the lower court's erroneous application of a codified equitable doctrine effectively 
trumping Mr. Taylor's statutorily authorized interest in the property. 
The Bank's theory would allow an invalid, essentially phantom conveyance, 
made and recorded by a grantor not having any property interest at the time of 
conveyance, to suddenly have the effect of nullifying intervening and valid interest 
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by utilizing the equitable doctrine of after-acquired title. The Bank seeks to cheat a 
prior lender (Mr. Taylor - who lent before the Bank) out of his security by 
ignoring his properly recorded interest recorded on September 6,2006 and 
granting the Bank a fee interest when it did not obtain any interest from an owner 
until December 22, 2006, which interest was subject to Mr. Taylor's deed of trust 
when Mr. McDonald received the same. This Court has the opportunity and 
obligation to interpret the law consistently and conclude that the after-acquired-
title statute does not function to remove validly recorded intervening interests. 
DATED AND SIGNED this 17th day of February, 2011. 
TYCKSEN & SHATTUCK, L.L.C. 
Chad C Shattuck^ 
Attorney for Defendant Bradford E. Taylor 
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Payment of1hfc mdebtsdsisis emdeiiced by a pmoiiSQirF note of erai date fai^eof £o fhe proopai mm of 
S3 35,000,00 i»de by Trusts, payable ta Ihe order ofJBene&oiiy at ffce time*, k the manner md with mtamt s£ 
thereto f e f i ^ and i ^ lbcpcdbmiDMofaidbia^ 
0f Tmste herefa M{iMiif4i to piynoit of indi widlliofiial hm& or id^ua«i m Imwim zmy bt nude m Tmsisr, 
or toiw^ewtri or isiigns* wbm evldtew»d% t pmMdss«y mt& m Mtes nediiag tlat toy iff $ecuyr$fi by fell 
Deed of Tn&t; tad to fajroeast of all smni «q^wfed or advEDced by B^wfieiity wd^ or pumimmt to the twrai 
btttofj COgoAttr with wtiznai iuswon m ber^ an fsmvided* 
To Protect the Security #f TfataDead of Tra^Truitor Agrees: 
1, To tep 5 ^ piDpeily k §ood OOTdMon ind rap&ta not "fe> ftaiKr« or d^xnoink my buildfa^ <to^f»^l to 
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cusplate m jestore pwptly mi m |^od and wwtamnlike mtuier my bulldog wbidb may be 
€caiftroc«i4 dirasfa! or destroyed ftweon; to comply with all inw% emmwm and rattrietsofss affiieting 
said property; not to stramrt or permit watfcitmsofjMtte 
prapsdy in violation of iaw to d© all Dtisur acfc wfafck from flic cfaaraete m no of laid proptfty may be 
wuDDBbly i^ewsiy, fie specific eiaiiwisrima hfimin not taodtidkig ttw general; and, if flag torn i$Mr$d 
bcreby or any part Amof is being obtained Br Ibe pnipose offto&wirig constiactioii of imtroTOft^ nts on 
seid pi openly Trttsfor tattler aife«: 
2. To c&mmesss sonstaidtan promptly &nd to pursue §an» vilh reasonable diligence to completion 
in memtimw with plant and spedlcarions satii&eimy to Beocficnry, and 
b* To dlow BeneMary to inspect iild proper^ af all times during ocanrtnietioa. Trustee* ttpon 
praentation to it of am affidavit $ipcrc h Beneficwy, setting frrtb fee* etowmg a default by 
Tftsstor under M$ numbered jttiafraph, is ailibocfccS to accept as te& god- raradnsive ill facte mi 
aiafcnaeefs therein, and f& act tiuomlimndeir.. 
2, Ta provide and mmidaia insnimnce* of auch ^ ?e or types and iwwiinis as Benefcfey may require, on the 
kproviramts mwmk^gmhnmftm mtzM orpta»d on said property. Sndtinamaa^ shall be DiffiW 
to Gotnpanies approved by Bettaida^y Drift lots payable ckus e& in fevor of and in ftcm juscflptab k to 
Bsnefidaty. In ibe event of ION, Ttasrtor sball gi¥c kimedlatt notice to Benefictay* who may n u b proof 
often, and eacb »ncniDe cos^wy coiMJcmed it hereby auftaftad and directed to nsafai payment for such 
tosi dkeetly to Beneleiif^ instead of i» Trustor and Beneleisiyjoin% and He »sura i^ proceeds, or 
any part teeof, my be applied by Beneficiary, at ii option, to the fidwtioe of the indebtedness h r a ^ 
seciiiedeft&fiisiBstii^^ 
provide iriMbct^hKiiri mmranee, 1fw Bmufekiy imy procure* on te "Itolafi behalf, inMrffl^in 
6 iw of Ae BamdteiBiy alone. If JWBIEBIU* cionot be s^ciirod by the Itnstqr to pmdite Ibe f«qpw3 
co¥cri|^ MM mU $aaM» so actof ddWtirafcrthe t&noi of ins I t e l ofTfltit; 
3, To driver tot pay fer ^ w! sminfcrin with Beaefioiary mt9l fte mdeb^feiiP mmmd hsmhy ja paid in M l 
such evld«me«i of fide as Batiisfeiaiy ovy nBqairtr tajslrndkig abflfmcts of Me or poHe m of tide msuranac 
ind my sadansloiss c^  f©3ewabi ftra^f or flgpleroenls ftusxeto, 
4, TP appear k mi i^an! any action carpniegeflta| puqpoitQig ID i f e t t t e ucinicjr her^C &e tilte to eajd 
property, or ttus rigto Of POTTO of Bcoeffciaiy or Tinstee; aM choold Bei^leffliy ©f mmm elect to appear 
to « defend any mefe action nr i»oc»$dSnff to pay all ©o^ aiid expense^ fectadlng cart of evldei^ of title 
BBE! ittofflay^fes m i fewonabk attmiacwndbyBenefioitty or Thntee^ 
5, T^pay at least 10 day&bcfiTC 4itoqiraEy all taxN rad a^essmeffi affietfef ^M pit^ pcxiy, tolndl^g aU 
H g^agma^ H i^cie water OOTpany aiodk a^daD msis, aasessmj^ Hi aind ciiEtges fisar waier^  qppartnutto m 
wz& in ooaneedon wiflisaM f«peft|n: to pay, utos toe, all en«mtas^as» idaM^sr and liens -with internal* 
on wd piopeity m aoy p i t ttisreof, Which at any time appeal tn b^ prior or superta bemto^ 1o pay a l 
wmt fees, and «^ pwws5 of ibis TmwL 
6, To pay in Bspsfidsiy moafWy» in ad¥a3a»f an asiront* as es&na^d hy Bfmc&iaiy in iia diseietlQO, 
affiorat tn pay iE torn and asseSimWsi affixing said pro^ty, and al prejriimii OB insurance therefor, 
as aid when the samr sbalJ become due, 
?, Si^iW TriMtiK: M 1o snake siiyp&yroseto«r do any lot m bei!ei&pioi'idbi# iMmB«OifeiaTy oi Thutoe^ but 
wiiboil oblifadui so to fl& a^dwtb<it3t noto la or deraudigiott Tkvator ai^ 3 i^flacHiimlemriag Trnate 
{ron*j any obli^slira bcicDf; jnsy, Mike or din fibs aaxii^  
Amm vtsa&GMvry to pnttKtfbe ^cam^r bawoC Bannfidiiy or Tfl»*» being mtbra^d to tmten^on said 
propffi^  for TOApiapoae^ ©OOTGMIC^ appear in and defend any a^im^rpiti^edioii ptjipoitiag to zffzst 
Ibe '$mm$$ baisaf or te ri#rt^i or pow« ofB^^fioiaiy odfTnfi^; pay, proline, neatest or aMfaromi^ 
my eommbranse* ebarp c^ Vol wUob in te jniporaat of df l« appiOTi Do be prior or superior beteto; and 
in OTsraisii^si^h powm, inem any liabliiy, expaod wbiiEnw amounts in its jibaolttte diSOTtios it m y 
dte^nneeessaiy flsB^fee, binding eo^ of eyidfiise of tide, ersf ley oouuat, and pay hfe teascnable fees. 
| r To jF>f inmid^^^ and wiikmt &mm& afl eum esspsnded bep^p4«r by Beneficiary of TfUSHe* mih 
kmmfmm dale of exp^lttee at fcra^ of ^ ^0% p^amnmiiMllfdd, and tef^aynraittbereof iball 
le sscrorsc hereby. 
$t Ta pay to Benefidsiy a mlBM *Mrg%m ®£mt to aoGceod Ezzm for m&h Qm Dolkr (S1.0D) ox" each ppymeni 
H W * ^ > ^ „ _ _ 
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4m iifimiodsr m im punomt to tto aafoRmid praBMOxyaote ofevan data ten^f wMdik moce torn Etro 
dap m nmanL TWB pnyniemt dmtl b« wade to com due oeto expert involved 133 handling ihe dofinqucat 
P&viiiciits< 
10 TTU MUTUALLY AGFJSED TBATJ Stolid aasd property or any p i t thereof be taken or imaged by 
KsasOT of my paMte tapwnmrt or e^iy^mm^kitipioc^dii^ m damaged by Are, a? earthquake, or in 
any oflwiunaeri Be»e&iBiy ahiMte ratified to aHoanf®Mlioiif twndt, trad cflinrpByninite or irikf 
fesreftie, and abail te^iiSe*! it its option 10 coamewe, appair to indpmi^nte iaiti GTOD name, any 
action or proceeding*, ac lo mate my eonqpranilae or taOtaaat, m comecti^ B with msk taking or draajge* 
AH such cnnipeissatum, awaida* tenagss, 4gte of actios aid proceeds, iadndiJig the proceeds of any 
polki^offti^andcfe 
after dodnat&i therefrom aU to expend inekiding attorney feea, apply the sEme m my iadflfbtoteoss 
accumd tatiiy* Trustor agrees to ra&»& ptcfa farther laaipranME of any scupn^atida, iwarij ^armies, 
md f igtm of asiion and psxwcraA a§ Bmdficiary or Ttoatae npry repine* 
1L Al lay time aitdftw* fc to time *opOT mlttmttMpfiat of Bsojefioiaiy, papasirt of ilt feea andprcacatatian 
of tine Deed of Time and fee note for iwdbiscme&tt (M e w of fiilln^aovipTO^ for cancellation md 
retenioit) ¥ * 3 ^ 
mi wmm&ixhmm *» k t e i ^ of aiirparly jatafaf n this Deed nf Tnut Tralea may (a) €*2ossnt to to 
making of my map or ptaf of aaiil praptrtyi (b) job in grtaltoi any casement or creatine any mitxictlon 
thcrtOTi^  (c) join many siibordination or odoar agrtsn^nt affbetiflg this Deed of trust mr the lien or charge 
thereof; (d) grant any ex tend or modification of fee trow of Ada loan; {#) raoonviy, mOuut warranty,, 
all or my piftof laid jrop&ty* Ha panice faany fes^wyspsc may be daforibed m "tbnpcraon or 
pOToes etiitlid turreto®, and to faetata therato of any maltaa m fam JUMJI b^ cc^idteive prcicif of flie 
traitfiik^s tberaoC TmBtar agrees to pay icaeamble trwtese^ fin far my of fhe ^rvi^f nicatioard 211 iks 
paia^ r^ ph> 
12, As additkEjal iea«i%rf Tmstsar hscfll^ y aesigiis 10 BwnslemTy, diizsig fie oartmiMiBa of tosc tmat^ ill 
imto, mmimt foyilto aMppaifiB of i^ pncfHsrqf affiKJfedby ttis Iksed of tcnat md of any pra^pal propM^ 
l^atad iisnsos. l&tf fritter aWJ ddtolt in Hue p^praal of any fadebtKiaKss iscimd be^by c^ in the 
performance of my ogreemff^ thcrcutsder, TnmtDi shall bavr- tfae ngh: to DoHcct aO a^dbirdai^ "mmm* 
xoyBltieB aadprofiti ™ndi|ifelo da&eltia toy besoms due m i paysbk. IfTmslof riW1dc&i#as 
pfrmaidy Truyt^ B right to saltot any of si^ cb mnaevfr shall cca s^ and Beiieficiar>r shall hzvc ih^ngkt 
wttb or i^oiitttkm£pt^w^io3S of toprp|N^adBbciiBdJbfs^^ to ^ ol^tiyQ WBH, royalticap issues, and 
profits FsfiisK? isr fi^ontiiumBGc of Beuoflfiraaiy at an}r lima or from tun* to time to cotost «@^  sw* 
nHJuaysshalluot iifli^iiiaiiairaffi^ tfacsutefiyMrt «fon^Grait%Bm«iakry of titezi|M pow^s md 
autiwrily to oolteet ^  asunciSw NQ^ tiuni: coixlaiasdhcrcki, nai the exercise- of the righ* by BmdQbkry U; 
cdlacl; sbaU be, orcooiitnMdtD bct m afflawlicmliy Bta^rib^ of my tanancy, kasc rar option, noi in 
a i smpte of liability tinder, nor a suborfmitic^ of Iha Kan or charge of fidt Deed of TVost to any sn&h 
t«nanr>'f ICBK or option. 
B, Vpm my db&ulc by Trustor karetfcfideir, Bciusficiaiy may it my $m witiout notice^ dtbrar in peaoi), by 
agcni, 01 by 3 receiver JD be appomxed by i M u t {Tmatof' hanby conBcntiiig to the appointment of 
B$nfificiar>r m sucii Ttvzwtfh md m&on! regard 10 the adequacy of any a^nd^ fw the indcbtc±ics£ 
hereby secured, «ti&r up<m and take p^wiaioa of HEidpropcit}r 01 any pan tiisre f^, in in mm name mm fox 
or ufbemisc collect said rents, issues, ^ nd protlti;, i^cludsne those past dm: md unp&id, unci apply tbe msm* 
IsEi 0 0 ^ md mpcmsz of ppeiratio» and colbcfckm, milling jwnwable attanMyta ibes, upon my 
iudcbtcdii-sss szcm&d lusreby, md m such a^te i$ BcacfjcianMnay ckicmunc 
14. Tfa& ml^ OTf ipon md ^ »kkg poitwasm adfmald prapai^^ Urn colteiocii of am* rcrua, JBmies^  m i profits, or 
to pmcsfcdto of Art mi a^bErmswmm policial m mmp^m&m or awtnfc for aiay taking ©r damage of 
aid pfoparty3 and fcc ^ jplk^too or TBIOUK fhanMkf M t f i ]^^^ , iWJ nM omc or waive any default 01 
note of daimll hwcundcr or hi validate any act done pimi^iiit to mzh nntke. 
15 Tm faikrc on tfij part of teBmffficiaiy to prosafifly saifome my fight teewte" shill not cpffrati? as B 
Wiiy^ of mch ri^t and the i^iver by Bmeffioiaiy of any default shal not constitet« a w»ive?r of my cr te 
or subsequent de&ult, 
16 Tim? ii of tit* awsucs how£ Upon da&idt fey Trustor in ft^ pyttN^t of amy fcukfctcikess scctund tlrnr^y 
or Im to pcrformaBcc of any ugrsement hereunder, all sums ^cuied hereby shaD iinniediiitcly b^ooin^ ihr. 
md poynbb al the option of BcDefoisry. In the mrnt of such defituh, Btmeficbry may execute or CQUBC 
Trmtee to oic^ula a written nolii^ of deftnlt and of stolon to came sdd praprarQ? lo b» told to satisfy &t 
IniSals. ^
 ^ 
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obligation* h&rmi m£ Tnmtm abiO file such ootkc for jeisori in eacii somity wherein said property or 
some put or pMCBI thereof is rii®ated~ Beneficiary also shil! deposit wifli Tinted to noa end s i 
doctimeofs frvidenicaiB tt^pt ndftarca scanted hariby. 
11* After to ^>ie ofsuch toe is nay torn be Ee*pfared % law following the nswditioa of aid notto of 
dflfiralf, and TOtto of default and notice of ale liaving hem gbm. m toi i^qniisd by kws Tnutee, without 
demand on Trustor, shall til] said property nn the date szt] &t to tiro and pbse designated hi §iM n©fe of 
ale, eitor as a whois or in separate parcel^ and in such order ai t amy d t^ennme (but jeuibject to any 
itatntery right of Tcoator to dizeet to aider in which ndhi property if^an^tetmg of aveal known b:s or 
parody ifcaU&e sold% if piiiikauctioiifo to Mgt*^Mdder, fepn#aie price payabk in kwMmraey 
of to United Stata at die time of aak. HispMOT ccmdnirfing to ale tOKyt fbr tay came he deem 
ejpedieof; poitpapc to sals from toe to toe UEifl liihalibe GCMi|itBlBdsn4 a « w y cuch caw, natke of 
paitpHAflant shall be given by public declaration thereof by suchpexsori at to toe cud pia^c Iss: 
appointed &r to eile; provide 4 if to ale if pcwlpcraed for hanger ton one iay beyoisd the day dsngn&ted 
in fbe nottee of ale, notice torsof ihall he grrat k to same manner m to Drigmel tmtkt of ate. Tfmcee 
laall e^ ecnaiE and dbHver to to pmnhsiier in Deed eoiivcyiiii asttpitypeiEty IO nUL'tatt witboiir m j 
covenant of wuimfy, mpmm erinplieA HIE iuilnb mtheDeed of my mattes or tots ihall be 
caMsfahre proof of die tathiibiess toteot Amy paeon, taWiigB^^BcLar}-, may hid at the ale. Troaa 
shall gpply toproeesdE of to wk lopeyamtof (1) to oonis md expenses of cocere i^ng the pewd of Me 
md of the eete, toMtag the payment of the Tnasto1! m i smOTey1** fees^ (2) oast of any wid»oe of title 
procure in eonoesikn with ituih ate and r&vtmm mmp$ on Tnistols Deed; (3] all sums e^end©5 under 
the torn hereof nM ton ispdd, with erased kteest at^ero% par m a m from data of oipciiditee; (4) 
ell otor tuma tic® iecnr«ifasrebyj md 5) to remainder if My, to to person orpenoni kgaHy tg^ BHIIed 
ftiaeto, or &c TVustess, k in tomticxD, miy depoiit fto baln^e ®£m®h pcooeolfi wi4 fla OsraQ^ Ckrk of 
to eatmtry k -#bici fte sale took piece. 
11 Tsusior sspuss to ismmd^ p^gession of to tertiwboYc described TiM pmpmf to ft^ Pwabus- at the 
afQ£»sai3 ate* tansd!a&iy after i»db ede, m the efrcat sudh po^iop^n has not Bievknjsly been 
^»o^l«rod by Tmite. 
IS, Upoai to 0Dmima» of any ds&n!r hMBUodsr, Bsmsflokty thall haw lbs optfoi to declare all sums se^nrod 
heidiy Immediately doe md pqnblfl md feseoiose Ihii B^d of Tost k flic n a m provided by tow for 
Ifae fopscka-ore of mei%&p« €mfealprtp«(ty ajifl Beneficiary ihall be outtltod tommmm wch 
wm®G®$kig& all coan aaui «q>siuieii teckSent ifacnslo^  mclniii^ e f^ s^oimbk attorne^i Ibe hi sudb ifflMfll n 
shall to fiioed % Ite canri 
20* B«iefckiy may ^ ppakt e iiMJcas^ or kuetee it wy Unaehy filing for leoordki to offiiee of to Qmmly 
I toMte ^TisachiaKiiily m wil&i siaipitiJc^ ot iCi«i^ piltftaffi©f ii ritxmled, a ^festttntkii of irwite^ 
Fmmto tiic^ ttoatatitixtifffl ii filed formcoi4 tonswtei^te shall Hucceed to all topowen, dntie^ 
atHiority md Ms rf tomiifBepairaaiMSto or of my incc^ r^artosfcesL lachsiudi aubgtttitttoii ekdl be 
executed aad ^is^wtodpid, and msto 0iw4Ktf&liril be givra end proof thereof me^, in to maimer 
provided by to kw« 
21. This D ?^d of Ttmt AeD spily to, tailf to to benent of; and bind dU piirti&i ii^^o, toll hetas, kgai^ei, 
devfenes, admkss&tfc^ eacemtoo, succesiors and taigBi. AE ohligatiims of Tknator ksiBmAsr aie joinf 
and aevoaL Tb§ tenn ^ eesfickrf ihall mmm the owner and bakter, fcebdbift eay piedfe, of to mole 
. In Iks Deed of Trna^ wksasever to ^»si0^t m mqpkm, to ssascidto genckr mcfaidee 1he 
• ani'orn^utsr, end to skgulxr mm^er includes the plurai 
22. trustee mmpt$ $m Itaat when this D^dcCTtot, duly exi%iih^ rai idkoowitdgrf, to JMie apiblk 
remri as pwided 1^ tow. T ^ ^ 
other Deed of Trait or of my iefto c*r proceediniB in which Itaeior, BeieftGWy, ar tnwtee shall be e pem f^ 
unkea braajhi by Tmiue. 
S , T3ds Deed of tnM Aall be eoiiata&ed aec^rdkg to to kwi* of to State of XJTAB. 
24," Tk? nudertigo^ Tipstermqoeste tot I oopy of my notice of deficit and of my sMtee of nie hranmder be 
maiM to Mm at lb uddimt henunbefoie eet ftntti. 
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GARY MCD0NA1D RYAN ANDBRSBN 
SmtsafOTAB 
CsimtyafSiJiDiki 
, befim ne, FOE NOTARY SEAL OH STAMP 
iNfataiy Pablfc in ami AM sdxl Coonty sad Slate* pcmonalij 
T T " " * OTOflTP"**?-!? Btf * Y J ^ ANDERS^ _ 
personally Idtowa to ns (or jammed . t o m e « t » tos of 
mtufasinry ovUenoa) tp be fe panoaCfl) *fao» aunafc) Wans 
tuhacribtd 16 th* WtMii iostnmHrt and acknowledged to ms 
that hc''shc./tliey executed ths Same i§ iriitaMwr authorized 
Mpadi]^)* and ttaf by hk to^Wr ajgnitaafi} n to 
tatranifHit fefe pefBsufil oar &e jastffer «&&m fe^lfj^ whkb i 
jwttan(s) mm, i 
WITNESS I 
NOTARY P ' JSLi r 
OANrEL A, BLANCO 
AuBtwi a. aooe 
Wt ia ls . ^ 
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Begioning it the N»ribw?mi Comer of the Southwest Quarter of Sechuii 29 Township 3 BwA Range I West Sail Like 
Bate and Meridian, & Salt Like County, Utah, and tmmfag tf*enee Smith 15X5 feet; theme Bait 289 Imti ihmoz North 
152.5 feet; iteoce West 289 feet to the point of begbinbig. 
LESS AND EXCEFT&JG any portion thereof lying within the boimds of 4000 Wail Street 
PARCEL! 
Begjoaiag 152.5 feet Soitib of fee N^thwggt comer of the Sratfaweif Quartfir of Section 29, Township 3 South, Range 1 
Wm, SaltLake Base sad Merifia^ is Salt Lake County, Utabp and itiaalng ifasn^e South 1525 fee; taec East 219 
feel, Micnee North 152 J ftet; thence West 2SS feel IP the point dTbegianinf. 
LESS AND EXCEPTING my portion lying within &e bounds of 4000 West Street. 
PARCEL 3: 
The North half of theNorfbvest Qimtte of die Scnrfbwat Qimter of Section 29, Township 3 South, Bangs 1 West, Salt 
Late B&ie tad Meridian* m Salt Lafe County, Utah, 
LESS AMD EXCEPTING aay potion lying within the bmmdf rf 4000 West Street. 
LESS AND EXCEPTING die feflowing four (4) parcels tf land: 
1> Beginning at the Northmen Cmm of the Soulbweet Quaiter of Section 29 TownEhip 3 South Range I West Salt Lata 
Biie and Meridian, in Salt Lais Cotmly, Utah, md xwmg, fhence Smith 152 J fee% tbewe Bajt 289 feel; thenoe Narth 
J 52.5 fee£ thenee West 289 fel to Qm ppim of beaming, 
2. Beginning 152,5 fee South erf the Northwest cumer of th« Southwest Q^aiter rf Section 29, T&wnahtp 3 South. Bmge 
J W « , Sail LaJte Base and MeridkOy in Salt Lake County, Utah, and nmntag fheooe SOTA 1525 feet; thence Bus* 2S9 
feet; thence North 152 J fast; theicc Waat 289 feet to flue point of tegiming. 
3. Ap&foel of land for tbepyippse of conatnic^ng teeon m expressway known m Project No, 0154, the boundaries of 
said parcel of land are de&srihed i t follows; Beginning al a point in the Northetly boundary line of aald mtm tract, 
whisfa point is 151J514 metess South 19*55*21w Eaat ftom the West Quarter Cmmer of said Section 2% wMoh point ii also 
22,86 snetm p^petiffloiiWy distant Wesioly ftcm the ©entedine of said piojedt, and raining Aence South OO^OS^ l1* 
West 203.702 meters ftaig a line paraM to paid oenterilne &* the Sotifiserly tKHinitory line of aald mtim bact; ilteisee 
South BSPStfSS* East 45.720 melons along ifae Southerly feoaoaikiy fine of iaid mlim tract to a point 22J60 nwtcn 
perpendicularly distant E^itely torn tte centerlipe of aaid pigcof; fttmq^ Not* OO^ OSTffi91 Bat 203.681 foeHn along a 
Ike ]HxaM io iaid oc^erlio^ to the Northerly bmiiNJaiy fine of said estfre tuc^ toc^ Norii 1^55^1 , r Wept 45.720 
oietcm along Ae bomd^y line of m& mtim trad to the pdnt of bqpsning. (NOTE: "TP dbnin distances in feat, divMe 
abnve dismnnf^  ly 0.3048.) 
4. Bcginniii ^ *^ to^sectios of Ihe Iksieriy right of wty line of an ^cpr^fwty known as Piojeot No* 0154 and the 
Wortterly boundary IMe nf mi& ^ tire trmt at a poM 2UB6D msina jsetpepdicularly dtent Butarly feoio this o^atlsriinc 
of *ud project, whidh point ii 1^7,234 m^oni South BFSttl" Bmi ftom fee WcM Qyiarte" Ccm^r of aedd Seotion 25. and 
rannkig tiieece South QffQSTiF Wmi 203,681 meien along a fine panUe! to MBM «n to ine to the Soutborly bonndmy 
Ike of iaid entire tract; thense SpiUh 19^56*55" But 206.067 mefen along said Southerly bmmdary line to the Southeast 
wmm of said estixe iraetj tence North OO^ OeHJl" Wej^ 203J88 met^i {nsoc^i SW.OOte^} aloog the Easterly bomdar>' 
tins to (ba Noath^iit comet of ^ ld entire trad; thence NsfA 89*55*211* West 205383 meters along sridNoatibftrly 
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boundary Tmt to the point of twgiariog. (NOTE: To ohmm difiturcai m feet, dtvifie abow diala&ces by 03048.} 
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